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 Almost three decades ago, historian Howard Kushner writes of his 
unease at increasingly neurological understandings of behaviour such as 
suicide. He argues that ‘[o]ne feature of neuropathological approaches, 
however, seems unaffected by this increasing sophistication: the more 
scientifically complex these investigations become, the more they tend 
to ignore the social and historical context in which the behavior that 
they seek to explain takes place’. 1 In these accounts, neurology displaces 
social context. In characteristically forthright terms, in 2014 Roger 
Cooter describes the turn to neurological explanations as ‘like becoming 
the victim of mind parasites’ because these explanations foreclose the 
ability to think critically about the social and cultural context of the 
explanations themselves: they are presented as universally true and 
outside of culture or history. 2 
 Self-harming emerges as an epidemic in Britain as pathological 
social communication and is transformed into affective self-regulation. 
Therefore it can serve as a barometer of broader changes in understand-
ings of human behaviour. Self-harm in the form of self-poisoning is 
understood as highly social; the self-damage by self-cutting, which 
displaces it, is understood as predominately internal. It is this internal, 
emotional quality that enables its easy fit within neurological and 
neurochemical frames of reference. The career of these behavioural 
archetypes can tell us much about the dominant ways in which human 
behaviour is understood: the ways in which behaviour is given meaning 
according to cultural assumptions that shift in their relative influence 
and credibility. In this conclusion I seek to do five things. First , I recap 
in summary form, the book’s main arguments and content. Then I want 
to reflect a little on the book’s methodological underpinnings, to show 
that I do not exempt myself from the kinds of analysis carried out in 
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the book. This happens in the Conclusion rather than the Introduction 
because it is easier to reflect in a comprehensible way upon this process 
when the argument has been laid out. Third, I sketch (very briefly) 
some of the ways in which self-harm-as-affective-regulation is now 
within the orbit of neurological explanations. Fourth, I expand upon 
the political significance of the internal, emotional understandings of 
self-damaging behaviour. Finally, I reflect upon the implications of this 
historical account of self-cutting and self-poisoning for human behav-
iour in general. 
 Summary of argument 
 Self-poisoning as pathological communication has a relatively short 
shelf-life. In 1975, Eliot Slater produces an article describing the state of 
psychiatry in the 1930s. He observes that ‘[t]he young in those days did 
not have today’s facilities for drug addiction, for self-inflicted wounds, 
for attempted suicide as a “cry for help”’. 3 What seemingly starts as a 
comment on the increased level of drugs circulating in 1970s society 
strikes a much more profound note by the end. In the 1930s, the 1970s 
patterns of ‘attempted suicide as a cry for help’ are simply not available. 
In the twenty-first century, whilst not invisible, self-poisoning as a cry 
for help has been eclipsed by deliberate self-harm, based around self-
cutting for emotional self-regulation. 4 
 As we have seen, between the 1930s and 1970s a number of objects 
under a variety of names (attempted suicide, pseudocide, self-poisoning, 
parasuicide) emerge through traffic between the therapeutic approaches 
of general and psychological medicine. Throughout the middle third 
of the twentieth century the relationship between psychological and 
general medicine is reconfigured, and the concepts used to label, treat 
and analyse patients presenting at hospital with a self-inflicted physical 
injury are subject to much change. Actions configured around violence 
and a fear of imminent fatal repetition give way, slowly and unevenly, 
to actions interpreted as a result of childhood psychological trauma, or 
attempts to communicate social and domestic stresses. This is not just 
a change in interpretive strategy, with some form of object constant 
beneath these different responses: the objects are fundamentally recon-
stituted in different contexts, by different practices. 
 The police-watching controversies articulate a concern over ‘would-be 
suicides’ due to a financial dispute between the police and voluntary 
hospitals. The potential for violence and repetition is emphasised as 
part of a strategy by hospitals to compel police to remain in attendance 
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whilst the patient is treated. The potential for immediate repetition 
carries with it the implication that the attempt is aimed at death. A 
dispute then emerges between workhouse infirmaries and voluntary 
hospitals that again emphasises violence, but this time in order to place 
‘attempted suicide’ within the remit of workhouse infirmaries, as they 
are supposedly better equipped to deal with mental patients. 
 Legislative changes in 1929 and 1930 abolish the Poor Law and 
promote the informal (non-certified) treatment of mental disorder. As 
a result, psychological and general medicine come into a closer rela-
tionship around (mental) observation wards attached to general hospi-
tals. In many cases these wards are the old workhouse infirmary mental 
blocks, with workhouse infirmaries turned into local authority hospi-
tals at the abolition of the Poor Law. This closer relationship gives 
Consulting Psychiatrist Frederick Hopkins consistent access to various 
‘physically injured’ patients brought to his Liverpool observation ward. 
This arrangement makes visible a broadly coherent group of people 
whom he deems to have attempted suicide due to various social and 
constitutional factors, including ‘domestic stress’. He is aware of, but 
equivocal about, an old notion that attempted suicide is principally a 
manipulative communication. 
 The engagement with the psychological casualties of the Second 
World War prompts a number of interpersonal therapeutic experi-
ments. Psychological problems and mental suffering are seen as insepa-
rable from factors in the social environment. As part of this process, 
therapeutic communities are established at various sites in the United 
Kingdom by psychiatrists including Tom Main, Maxwell Jones, Wilfred 
Bion and John Rickman. Social environment and psychopathology 
become ever more closely entangled. 
 In 1948 the NHS is inaugurated, with mental health included in 
the comprehensive service. This removes any disputes about payment 
for certain classes of patient and effects a closer connection between 
general and psychological medicine. It is also part of increased collec-
tive and social welfare provision, nationalised industry and centralised 
planning. The remit of the state to manage, fund and direct social life 
(through social work, child protection, child guidance, welfare require-
ments and so on) is expanded. As part of this shift towards collective 
provision, the connection between mental and physical medicine is 
strengthened. At accident and emergency (A&E) departments for cases of 
attempted suicide, this link is not sufficient to produce a social constel-
lation around a physical injury conveyed to hospital. The presence of 
psychological medicine is still too marginal in casualty departments, 
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where the overwhelming focus is acute somatic medicine. However, in 
the early 1950s facilities for the treatment of poisoning, psychological 
scrutiny and psychiatric social work (PSW) expertise all converge at an 
observation ward in Edinburgh. This results in psychological scrutiny 
of physically injured patients, but also in the rooting of psychopa-
thology (through the conceptual apparatus of John Bowlby) in child-
hood emotional deprivation in so-called broken homes. Psychiatrist 
Ivor Batchelor and PSW Margaret Napier operate in tandem to construct 
a vision of psychological maladjustment and low stress tolerance in the 
background of these attempted suicide patients. This is largely achieved 
through intensive questioning and assiduous follow-up by PSWs. A 
similar object of concern is publicised around the same time in London 
observation wards by Erwin Stengel and co-workers (principally PSW 
Nancy Cook). This attempted suicide is again part of a crossover between 
mental and general medicine, but more focused upon a present-centred 
(often unconscious) appeal, in response to social difficulties. 
 In the late 1950s the final legal impediments to psychological treat-
ment at general hospitals are swept away in the Mental Health Act (1959) 
as part of a wider effort to eliminate as far as possible the differences 
between the treatment approaches. Connected to this effort, and using 
Stengel’s research, suicide and attempted suicide are decriminalised in 
England and Wales in the Suicide Act (1961). Both of these acts remove 
legal machinery from areas considered psychological in nature. Thus, to 
ensure that the appropriate kind of care is forthcoming, they are swiftly 
followed by government guidance to hospitals recommending psycho-
logical assessment for all attempted suicide cases seen at accident and 
emergency departments. This is actively followed up by the Ministry 
of Health; the variable results recorded demonstrate the difficulty of 
focusing intensive psychological scrutiny at casualty departments. 
 Whilst the government passes legislation, the Medical Research 
Council (MRC) sets up a unit for psychiatric epidemiology that ends up 
in Edinburgh, at the same ward that produces some of the 1950s studies. 
With the MRC’s backing, Neil Kessel embarks upon a project to study 
‘attempted suicide’, which he renames self-poisoning. Collaborating 
extensively with PSWs, Kessel roots the causes of self-poisoning firmly in 
the present, and as a conscious appeal, in an all-encompassing category 
of distress, centred upon a feminised vision of the home and supposed 
marital disharmony. 
 As the government starts to run down the asylum system and 
promote psychiatric units in general hospitals, a large number of 
studies, with varying degrees of psychological scrutiny, are able to 
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effect the transformation from ‘physical injury’ at casualty to ‘socially 
rooted appeal’. The growing self-evidence of the social constellation (in 
a society where the state’s social responsibilities are much larger than 
today) remains a product of much intellectual and practical effort. It 
means that a broadly causative social setting is increasingly presumed 
around a casualty admission for poisoning. This presumption makes 
the behavioural category increasingly stable, public and available as an 
intelligible human response to interpersonal difficulties. This broader 
self-evidence fuels new terminological offerings, with ‘parasuicide’ the 
latest neologism, proposed in 1969. 
 Alongside (and entangled with) this story runs that of self-cutting 
from the early 1960s. Self-cutting (especially of the wrists and arms) has 
long featured as a seeming methodological quirk in self-poisoning and 
parasuicide studies, presenting at hospitals as approximately 5% of cases 
of self-damage. In these general hospital-based studies, self-cutting or 
self-lacerating are not seen as motivated differently to self-poisoning. 
However, self-cutting also emerges in the context of psychiatric inpa-
tient institutions. Influenced by North American psychoanalytic inpa-
tient literature, a British corpus of studies on self-cutting, self- mutilation 
or wrist-cutting emerges. This is initially seen as related to the stric-
tures and constraints of the inpatient environment and provokes 
much interest and concern due to its highly distressing and contagious 
epidemic nature. However, as the 1960s pass into the 1970s, a sense 
emerges from these inpatient studies that self-cutting is motivated by 
internal, emotional psychopathology grounded in a sense of intolerable 
psychic tension. 5 This sense remains strong in the current literature on 
self-cutting. As Karen Skegg reports in 2005 in the  Lancet , this is not a 
clear-cut disavowal of communication, but instead the relative domi-
nance of internal, emotional and tension-based factors: ‘Reported moti-
vations for adult superficial self-mutilation included: to relieve tension, 
to provide distraction from painful feelings, as self-punishment, to 
decrease dissociative symptoms, to block upsetting memories, and to 
communicate distress to others’. 6 
 This re-reading of self-cutting is then (from the late 1970s) imported 
from the inpatient studies into the A&E-based samples. This first seems 
to be done coherently and explicitly in a study conducted by Keith 
Hawton in the mid-1970s and published in 1978. This differentiation 
then begins to make sense of the hospital/A&E presentations during the 
1980s. Thus the idea that self-cutting and self-poisoning are differently 
motivated behaviours begins to gain traction. Self-cutting becomes stabi-
lised as a method of internal affective regulation, whilst self-poisoning is 
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rendered more ambiguous: it features both as a genuine suicide attempt 
and socially directed self-damage. 
 The growing ambiguity of self-poisoning and its eclipse by self-cutting 
might tentatively be connected to a fracturing of the kind of psycho-
logical expertise that first produced it. Between 1977 and 1980 a number 
of clinical studies are published that question whether assessment by 
psychiatrists is necessary in every case. A consensus is reached that other 
professionals such as social workers, nurses or junior doctors – with some 
training provided by psychiatrists – are equally competent to do this. 7 
 In 1981 a working party is set up by the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
at the invitation of the Department for Health and Social Security 
(DHSS, successor to the Ministry of Health). The group includes Norman 
Kreitman, Hugh Gethin Morgan and Irving Kreeger, who are asked to 
review government guidance on the management of deliberate self-
harm. (This term is defined in the report as covering ‘patients who injure 
themselves by poisoning or other means’ – so poisoning is predomi-
nant here.) One of the outcomes of this working party is that a Hospital 
Notice is issued in 1984, drawing attention to the report included with 
it. Specifically, the notice emphasises the recommendation that ‘suitable 
trained medical practitioners, other than psychiatrists, may undertake 
the psychosocial assessment of patients who deliberately harm them-
selves, and that referral – in some cases, to professional workers, other 
than psychiatrists, who have received special training – may be consid-
ered appropriate’. 8 Thus, right at the point where self-poisoning treated 
at hospitals is becoming differentiated from self-cutting, the assessment 
of the (largely) self-poisoned patients at A&E can be delegated away 
from psychiatrists. 
 This fractures the intense psychiatric scrutiny (based around research 
articles) that has been shown to be so important in stabilising socially 
directed self-poisoning as a self-evident object of enquiry. So here again 
are specific practices that are prescribed by the state, and that influ-
ence the visibility of a psychological object. As much as the rise of self-
cutting might resonate – somewhat perversely – with neo-liberal ideas 
of self-reliance, and be part of the retreat of the state from social welfare 
spending (which is further explored below), there are still specific, 
mundane, administrative practices that correspond to the retreat of self-
poisoning from national significance. 
 It is not coincidental that the texts at the forefront of raising aware-
ness about self-cutting do not normally come from A&E, but instead 
from psychological clinicians involved in counselling – where the 
potential for intensively scrutinised case studies is much higher than 
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in busy hospital casualty departments. In addition, visibility is granted 
to self-cutting through its inclusion as a symptom of borderline person-
ality disorder in the third edition of the  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders in 1980. 
 Methodological reflection 
 This story is told through two principal sources of information: articles 
in medical and psychiatric journals, and government documents at the 
National Archives, Kew, and at the Lothian Health Services Archive in 
Edinburgh. In the first category there are also some dissertations – prin-
cipally McEvedy (1963), Keller (1970) and Waldenberg (1972) – that are 
not in journals, but still adopt the style, tone and formality of psychi-
atric research. The sources at the National Archives provide the basis 
for discussions of the police-watching controversies of the early twen-
tieth century, the machinations around the Suicide Act and Hospital 
Memorandum (1959–61), some extra information on Kessel’s Edinburgh 
unit (1961–5), and the hospital notice of 1984. The Lothian Health 
Services Archive principally furnishes extra information about Ward 3 
of the Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh. 
 Although archival sources form a significant proportion of this 
book’s basis, the predominant source base remains scholarly psychi-
atric research articles. Because these are written with scholarly apparatus 
(chiefly references), I am able to follow acknowledged trails of thought 
and influence. I use these to construct a more or less established ‘canon’ 
of documents by authors who refer to each others’ work. The key names 
should be familiar – Hopkins, Batchelor and Napier, Stengel and Cook, 
Kessel, Kreitman. This means that much of the rise (and fall) of self-
poisoning is seen through the lens (and constraints) of research output. 
When this significantly drops off, and self-cutting largely displaces it as 
the meaning of ‘self-harm’ or ‘self-damage’, this does not mean that I 
am making a strong argument about the numbers of people performing 
these actions. As I hope is clear, the numbers of people reported in any 
given study depend largely on the institutional basis for such a study 
(for example, whether inpatient or outpatient) and on the specific prac-
tices used to find and evaluate cases. 
 This historical method is paired with very tight focus on the subject 
matter of the articles: unpicking lines of argument, searching for mentions 
of specific practical arrangements, evaluating the position of various 
professionals (PSWs, police, etc.). It does not leave very much space for 
the ‘patient experiences’ of self-cutting or overdosing. This features in a 
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small way, when patient testimony is used and deployed by psychiatrists 
as evidence. This is especially useful when patients confound expecta-
tions (as in Watson’s 1970 study), or requires significant intellectual work 
to make it fit (as in Waldenberg, 1972). However, this is principally a 
study of specific hospital practices, a certain set of psychiatric ideas about 
the social setting, and how these might resonate with a wider political 
context: a shift from a welfare-based, socially interventionist consensus 
to one of individuated, market-oriented competition. Roy Porter cham-
pions ideas of the ‘patient’s voice’ as central to the history of medicine, 
but this is not my principal area of interest. 9 I am far more concerned 
with how ideas and research practices interact and produce the concepts 
and shorthand that humans use to understand themselves and others. 
Basing this book on the experience of the patient would make it a very 
different project. In addition, Joan Scott writes persuasively:
 When experience is taken as the origin of knowledge, the vision of 
the individual subject (the person who had the experience or the 
historian who recounts it) becomes the bedrock of evidence on 
which explanation is built. Questions about the constructed nature 
of experience, about how subjects are constituted as different in the 
first place, about how one’s vision is structured – about language (or 
discourse) and history – are left aside. 10 
 I am most interested in how ‘vision is structured’, in how ideas and 
practices come to influence what is possible and explicable behaviour, 
and how these change. This is not to demean patients or their stories, 
experiences or identities, but to say that this history attempts something 
different. The patients and their experiences recede in this telling, as do 
the psychiatrists to an extent. What is left are practices, arrangements, 
ideas, concepts – all the things that recur in psychiatric journal arti-
cles and government documents. This, like all history, must resemble 
its sources, but remains useful – hopefully to people other than myself – 
because it enables new connections to be made around self-harm, society, 
psychology and politics. It might make the various individuals involved 
in the story less visible (in terms of their experiences), or flatten them 
out to their research contributions, but it also allows new links: between 
categories of identity and the rise of professional groups; between broad 
political contexts and clinical categories; between an intellectual climate 
in psychology and psychiatry and the ways in which we understand self-
damaging behaviour; between politics and the ways in which people 
understand themselves and their identities. 
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 The rise of neurology 
 To return to specifics, we see that self-cutting is both a residual and a 
newly emergent category. It is understood – gradually and unevenly – 
as a method of affective self-regulation rather than social communica-
tion. This opens the way to neurological explanations of the behaviour. 
This happens because neurological explanations focus upon the indi-
vidual’s nervous system as a privileged site of understanding. The reason 
that it is only a small step from ‘individual tension’ to ‘neurochem-
istry’ is that both approaches, or concepts, take the individual at their 
starting points. A communicative attempt, in contrast, focuses upon a 
social situation in which various people are embedded. However, even 
this contrast has recently become unstable, as there is work that inves-
tigates the ‘neurology of social cognition’ as well as sociological work 
on the discipline of neuroscience (upon which this book has drawn). 11 
However, the point stands that internal emotional turmoil maps much 
more easily onto neurological understandings than does psychosocial 
communication. 
 Although the neurochemistry of complex behaviour is widely 
acknowledged to be in its infancy (a claim also made in the 
mid-1970s), there are a number of guiding principles that underwrite 
these perspectives. Regardless of the particular system or neurotrans-
mitter that is implicated, these sorts of studies are all based around 
the assumption that neurochemistry is at the root of the behaviour, 
and operates prior to culture, and is indeed, outside culture. As Hilary 
and Stephen Rose argue with respect to molecular biology: ‘Again and 
again the molecular biologists leading the sequencing [of] the human 
genome [between 1990 and 2013] claimed that the completed genome 
would constitute human identity’. They add that ‘The neurosciences 
have not been left behind; their claims to explain selfhood, love and 
consciousness as located in certain brain regions ... have been articu-
lated in a string of popular books’. 12 Given the audacity and ambition 
of these claims, it is unsurprising that neuroscience and neurobiology 
are increasingly utilised to investigate the (comparatively modest-
sounding) self-cutting-as-tension-release in order to reveal its neuro-
logical basis. 
 Michael Simpson is among the first to speculate upon a biological 
basis for the behaviour of self-cutting in 1976, but he is notably cautious 
in ascribing the behaviour any secure biological basis. 13 In 2001, Fiona 
Gardner (a psychoanalytically trained therapist) writes in a cautious and 
equivocal vein about ‘self-harm’:
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 [T]he behaviour can be coercive, in that self-harming produces 
a wanted response from others; second, it is relieving, in that the 
action produces a lightening of mood, either through biochemical 
alterations and the associated release of endorphins (the body’s own 
analgesics), or conditioning, or symbolically. 14 
 She mentions social (‘coercive’) explanations, followed by biochemical, 
classical conditioning and symbolic understandings. These cautious 
studies exist alongside publications by such as Schroeder, Oster-Granite 
and Thompson’s text,  Self-Injurious Behavior: Gene-Brain-Behavior-
Relationships , published by the American Psychological Association in 
2002, and which pushes much harder to understand behaviour in terms 
of the brain and genetics. 15 In the 2010s, there is increasing recourse 
to neurochemical and biological explanations to explain ‘self-injury’. 
David Brent, in a recent editorial for the  British Medical Journal , sees self-
injury as ‘most commonly used as a mood regulation strategy ... thought 
to relieve negative affect through the release of endogenous opioids’. 
Whilst Brent does argue for the relevance of the social context, he also 
maintains that the difference between suicide and self-injury can be 
established with reference to neurochemicals: ‘Although nonsuicidal 
self-injury and suicide attempts often occur in the same individual 
and share some common risk factors, their motivations, reinforcers, 
and neurobiology are distinct’. 16 This is an explicit attempt to separate 
suicidal behaviour and self-injury, not simply in terms of motive but 
in terms of a distinct neurobiological pattern. In addition, as emotions 
and moods are increasingly understood in neurological terms, so self-
injury becomes enmeshed in neurological explanations. For example, 
as borderline personality disorder (closely associated with self-injury) is 
understood through neurochemical frames of reference (e.g., neuropep-
tides), self-injury is increasingly ‘neurologised’ by association. 17 Efforts 
have also been made to associate self-injury and suicidal behaviour with 
the neurochemical serotonin and the serotonergic system. 18 
 However, there also exists considerable circumspection amongst the 
more prominent psychological experts on self-injury about how much 
this behaviour might be reduced to biological bases. Favazza is scep-
tical of neurology and neurochemistry – as might be expected of a 
‘cultural psychiatrist’ whose undergraduate degree is in anthropology 
under Margaret Mead. He notes that there may be a swing back towards 
analyses that focus upon the social or cultural environment: ‘although 
psychiatry is focused on the primacy of cellular, genetic and neuronal 
approaches, there is a growing recognition that culture cannot be 
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ignored’. 19 To him, it is clear (in 2011) that cells genes and neurons are 
at the forefront of conventional explanations. In a similar vein, sociolo-
gists Adler and Adler are clear about their desire to ‘demedicalise’ self-
cutting, understanding it instead through sociological concepts such as 
deviance and social reinforcement. 20 It should be noted that sociological 
and psychological explanations persist – based upon learning and peer-
group influence, and yet remain based upon ideas of emotional regula-
tion. This is not a simple dichotomous split. However, over the past 
decade there have been many efforts to understand self-harm through 
neurochemical and neurological frames of reference. Health commu-
nications scholar Warren Bareiss concludes that media narratives of 
self-injury consistently downplay possible social causes of self-injury in 
favour of a model that understands self-injury as a personal choice. 21 
This idea of an individualised, personal choice meshes well with neuro-
chemical understandings, as well as with market-based ideology that is 
centred upon a rational, autonomous consumer. 
 This is a complex and nuanced picture, where social – and socio-
logical – explanations can co-exist with ideas of internal tension and 
can also feed into neurological explanations. There is no easy way to 
sum them up. However, we can be more certain about the shifts at the 
heart of this book: that the archetypes of self-damage from the 1930s to 
the 1980s have undergone radical transformations. This corresponds to 
local, mundane and administrative innovations, but also feed off and 
feed into much broader political constellations. It is to these that we 
now turn. 
 Neo-liberalism, individualism and biomedicine 
 The broad political picture in the United Kingdom between 1945 and 
the end of the 1970s is conventionally thought of as characterised by 
consensus politics, commitment to welfare and significant nationalised 
(collective) ownership of industry (including transport, communications 
and health care). Such a collective outlook corresponds with the ‘local 
picture’ drawn in this book, consisting of a psychological perspective 
that is acutely aware of collective social life, communication and the 
embedded nature of human beings in their particular social contexts. 
This consensus politics is displaced from the late 1970s by a world view 
in which the family retains its importance, but there is much more of a 
focus on individual competition and self-discipline. 
 In general, neo-liberal thinking is based upon the primacy of market 
forces and the desirability of individual competition. Efforts to provide 
The Politics of Self-Harm 203
collectively are seen as stunting the individual’s competitive edge. This 
perspective on human life has its roots in the political philosophy of 
Friedrich von Hayek and the economics of the ‘Chicago school’, linked-
 with Milton Friedman and his associates and students. In Britain, this 
approach is most closely associated with the three governments headed 
by Margaret Thatcher between 1979 and 1990. It has been labelled ‘neo-
liberalism’ due to its stress on the old liberal values of economic freedom 
and self-reliance. Roger Cooter describes it as ‘the anti-Marxist philos-
ophy-cum-ideology founded on a view of human nature as entirely 
self-interested and incapable of thinking beyond “the market,” which it 
constructs and sells as an autonomous force’. 22 
 Journalist Andy McSmith’s popular history of the 1980s,  No Such 
Thing as Society , takes as its title the immortal words uttered by Margaret 
Thatcher in an interview with  Woman’s Own magazine in 1987. In full 
context, Thatcher argues:
 I think we’ve been through a period where too many people have 
been given to understand that if they have a problem, it’s the govern-
ment’s job to cope with it. ‘I have a problem, I’ll get a grant’. ‘I’m 
homeless, the government must house me’. They’re casting their 
problem on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. 
There are individual men and women, and there are families. And 
no government can do anything except through people, and people 
must look to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves and 
then, also to look after our neighbour. People have got the entitle-
ments too much in mind, without the obligations. 23 
 This is an exceptionally clear message that social problems (such as 
homelessness) should no longer be the preeminent concern of the state 
but of individuals (and in fact the individuals who are homeless). It 
displays a clear shift from a governmental responsibility for social prob-
lems to individual responsibility. We move from the social to the indi-
vidual. This can be usefully contrasted with Erwin Stengel’s concern, 
quoted at the start of Chapter 3, about a ‘society which has made every 
individual’s welfare its collective responsibility’. In one sense, Stengel 
and Thatcher are worried about the same thing: the burden that the 
exploitative ‘few’ might exert on the hardworking ‘many’. However, 
Stengel seems broadly to accept such a state, whilst Thatcher seeks to 
dismantle it. 
 As McSmith makes plain, this is an economic policy as much as 
anything else. Thatcher is congratulated upon the Conservative victory 
204 A History of Self-Harm in Britain
in 1979 by economist Milton Friedman (soon to become policy advisor 
to Ronald Reagan) in a rather grandiose exchange. Friedman gushes: 
‘Britain can lead us all to a rebirth of freedom – as it led us all down the 
road to socialism’. Thatcher replies: ‘The battle has now begun. We must 
win by implementing the things in which we believe’. 24 McSmith also 
makes abundantly clear that the ‘no such thing as society’ sentiment is 
present in Thatcher’s thinking in the late 1970s (and not just the late 
1980s when it appears). He cites handwritten notes for a 1979 speech 
proclaiming ‘no such thing as collective conscience, collective kind-
ness, collective gentleness, collective freedom’. 25 Her abhorrence of the 
collective and the social, and her championing of the individual, maps 
well onto the shift from social communication to internal emotional 
regulation. 
 Michel Foucault’s lectures at the College de France in the late 1970s 
contain a sophisticated discussion of neo-liberalism and its significance. 
He notes that it emerges in two distinct places, in similar forms: a German 
form, linked to a critique of Nazism and the post-war reconstruction 
and an American form, defined in opposition to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
‘New Deal’ and the federal interventionism of the Democratic presi-
dential administrations of Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 
B. Johnson. Foucault argues that these forms are united by ‘the main 
doctrinal adversary, [economist John Maynard] Keynes ... [and] the same 
objects of repulsion, namely, the state-controlled economy, planning, 
and state interventionism’. 26 According to Foucault, the state is recon-
ceptualised as the guarantor of economic freedom, but more than that:
 Since it turns out that the state is the bearer of intrinsic defects, and 
there is no proof that the market economy has these defects, let’s ask 
the market economy itself to be the principle, not of the state’s limita-
tion, but of its internal regulation from start to finish of its existence 
and action. In other words, instead of accepting a free market defined 
by the state and kept as it were under state supervision ... [instead] 
adopt the free market as organizing and regulating principle of the 
state, from the start of its existence up to the last form of its inter-
ventions ... a state under the supervision of the market rather than a 
market supervised by the state. 27 
 Given the huge range of commentators on this shift, I here take just 
three other examples almost at random, for illustrative purposes. Perry 
Anderson’s collection,  Spectrum , analyses the writings of diverse polit-
ical thinkers, and his appraisal of Ferdinand Mount (active in writing 
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Conservative Party policy in the 1980s, including the General Election 
Manifesto of 1983) is that the Labour Party’s ‘construction of a welfare 
state, technocratic in design and bureaucratic in delivery ... is the 
consistent object of Mount’s dislike’. 28 Butler’s and Drakeford’s analysis 
of social-work scandals in twentieth-century Britain characterises the 
Conservative governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s as ‘rede-
fining the welfare state in such a way that a premium was attached to 
notions of individual rights and personal freedoms’. 29 Rose and Rose 
argue that successive governments from the late 1970s onwards begin 
‘enthusiastically exchanging the political economy of the welfare state 
for that of neo-liberalism. The rise of transnational corporations, able to 
spread production processes across countries ... together with the attack 
on organised labour, began to sap the very foundations on which the 
welfare state was built’. 30 Here we have the core of neo-liberalism: indi-
vidual rights, antipathy towards the welfare state and organised labour, 
and a stress upon self-reliance rather than collective provision. 
 This political shift broadly coincides and intimately corresponds 
to the much more individualistic reading of self-damage, based upon 
emotional self-regulation. Indeed, neo-liberalism’s stress on individual 
actors’ radical freedom to make choices for their own benefit fits well 
with a model of self-harm that emphasises the individualistic, private 
feelings of tension, and the self-regulation of these through cutting. The 
coincidence of neo-liberal political ascendency from the early 1980s 
in the United States and United Kingdom, and the displacement of 
the social setting from understandings of self-damage are not chance 
occurrences. 
 In a similar vein to this book, Gillian Harkins analyses the shift from a 
welfare economy to neo-liberal one in terms of the emergence of certain 
human categories of behaviour. She connects the socio-economic shift 
to neo-liberalism to an emergent concern about predatory paedophiles:
 Harkins links the way in which we have constructed the paedophile 
as the ultimate monster to the vilification of the state as the enemy of 
the free market. Each form of discourse is linked to, and helps support 
the other, through a shared model of human nature and its interests. 
The state and the paedophile [are] depicted as stealing the natural 
potentiality of the child. 31 
 So here we can see the ways in which apparently independent 
phenomena are linked to broad political changes, perhaps counter-intu-
itively. The figure of the paedophile and the new vision of a suffocating 
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state are founded upon the figure of the child and its potential. Harkins 
expands upon this link, claiming: ‘Older modes of social security ... will 
be replaced by demands for a new type of “security” in the face of 
universal danger [the paedophile]. This security operates through the 
proliferation of risks and controls rather than the enclosure of disci-
plinary space’. 32 Thus Harkins sees a shift from enclosed, family, social 
spaces, to a much more diffuse and distributed space. This is analysed 
and developed through the varied categories and objects that popu-
late our lives. In the same way, the rise of self-cutting as based upon 
autonomous, self-regulating individuals pushes out a reading of socially 
embedded, collective responsibility for psychological distress. No longer 
is pathology redistributed onto spouses or social relations (in Thatcher’s 
terms ‘casting their problems on society’) – it is internal, individual and 
self-regulated. 
 The relationship between the two outlooks and their different scales 
(macro and micro) is complicated and rather opaque. It is approaching 
the banal to say simply that they feed off each other and correspond to 
each other. This sentiment might be developed by arguing that from 
the infinite possibilities of human behaviour, only a small number ever 
congeal into perceptible objects and are labelled as traits, syndromes 
or patterns. We see with self-cutting that a large number of other 
behaviours (such as swallowing objects, smashing windows, parox-
ysms of rage or social imitation) are consistently downplayed in order 
to produce a comprehensible object. In the same way, self-poisoning 
as communication neglects internal psychological states in favour 
of charting the psychological significance of the environment. In a 
general sense, these objects rely upon the intellectual and institutional 
conditions, where they are studied and from where they are publicised 
(secure inpatient facilities, A&E, counselling services, psychoanalytic 
interviews, and so on). The objects that appear from these settings can 
then be regulated, studied or managed (by government memoranda, 
informal referral arrangements, or specially designed questionnaires). 
If that management is removed or undercut (by a rethinking of the 
responsibilities of the state), then the objects fall from view, leaving 
space for others. These new objects are more likely to attain promi-
nence if they resonate with other changes going on in the political 
sphere. 
 But it is important to remember that mundane arrangements like 
the fracturing of psychiatric scrutiny on self-poisoning in 1984 are just 
as important – and certainly more accessible to historians who seek 
to explain change. In a similar vein, Waldenberg’s (1972) refocusing 
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attention away from communication (and its association with ‘atten-
tion-seeking’) is part of his strategy for dealing with nursing staff’s 
‘grumbling’ about self-cutting patients. In order to promote the care of 
these patients in ways he considers appropriate, he emphasises internal 
tension. These arguments remain important today, in the politics of 
deliberate self-harm. Labels such as ‘attention-seeking’, bandied about 
by the media, tend to trivialise the behaviour, so clinicians who are 
interested in taking it seriously and treating it might become wary of 
discussing or emphasising ‘communicative intent’. 33 
 We have discussed the resonance that self-cutting as tension-release 
has with neo-liberalism, and also that between self-cutting as tension-
 release and neurochemistry/biomedicine. We can complete that partic-
ular triangle of associations by briefly discussing the resonance between 
technological biomedicine and neo-liberal economics. As Kaushik 
Sunder Rajan argues in  Biocapital , ‘the life sciences represent a new 
face, and a new phase of capitalism and, consequently biotechnology 
is a form of enterprise inextricable from contemporary capitalism’. 34 
Rose and Rose follow a similar line of thought, arguing that ‘the life 
sciences have been transformed into giant biotechsciences, blurring 
the boundaries between science and technology, universities, entrepre-
neurial biotech companies and the major pharmaceutical companies, 
or “Big Pharma”’. 35 So the welfare state is rolled back, individualism 
and self-reliance are stressed, capitalism becomes largely unregulated, 
biotechnology flourishes and, self-damage as response to a social setting 
is displaced by self-damage as self-regulation of internal tension. This 
internal tension is then significantly (though not totally) ‘biologised’ 
and rooted in brain biochemistry. A detailed study of the interactions 
between these threads is for another book. What I want to emphasise 
here is that the mass of labels and psychological objects that populate 
our lives do correspond to wider political contexts. Self-poisoning as a 
cry for help is largely invisible today (even as self-poisoning numerically 
dominates A&E statistics for self-harm) partially because the embedded, 
funded and self-evident awareness of social contexts has largely disap-
peared from the political mainstream. 
 Neurology and neo-liberalism are also linked through their wholesale 
forgetting or belittling of the social context. In fact, it is this determined 
omission that gives both neo-liberalism and the turn to neurology their 
fundamentalist zeal. It serves as fuel for its evangelising of the revealed 
neurological, or competition-based eternal truths of human nature. To 
quote Rajan again: ‘[C]apitalism, which is triumphantly acknowledged 
today as having “defeated” alternative economic formations such as 
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socialism or communism ... is therefore to be considered the “natural” 
political economic formation’. 36 This is not to belittle neuroscience or 
capitalism in a tit-for-tat battle as neurologists and neo-liberals attempt 
to cast ‘the social’ as irrelevant. Nor is it to claim that neurochemistry has 
no impact upon how humans behave: Who could doubt the influence 
of the body upon the mind? The thing that baffles and unnerves me in 
equal measure is the refusal of some to countenance that this embrace of 
neurology is itself a culturally, socially situated phenomenon. The ways 
in which we search for a handle on human nature change over time, 
and are parts of humanity’s socially influenced, culturally saturated 
existence. The claims of science to be beyond culture, to be a method 
by which unarguable truth is revealed, begins to sound more and more 
theological the more entrenched it gets. It also fails to see how the ways 
in which science considers itself beyond cultural contexts and biases – 
the complex notion of objectivity – have themselves changed over the 
centuries. 37 The idea that laboratory science lives up to its self-billing as 
a controlled, bias- and culture-free environment has been convincingly 
demolished for some time. 38 
 There is of course a level of circularity in arguing that various social 
(and practical) contexts can explain the fluctuating fortunes of the social 
context. These arguments are just as historically specific, and deserve 
some reflection and analysis. Part of the answer is that I seek to analyse 
what counts as truth in different historical periods. However, this does 
not answer the question of why I have written an account that focuses 
partially upon a social context (in the form of intellectual climate in 
psychology and psychiatry) in order to explain the rise and fall of a 
socially focused medical category. This might be clarified by explicitly 
stating my motives for writing this book. I feel deeply uneasy that neuro-
logical and neo-liberal explanations (including ideas of human nature, 
as much as economic policy) are ascendant, to the detriment of socially 
aware, collective approaches that emphasise the environment and the 
interpersonal parts of human existence. 39 Market forces, competition 
and the roll-back of the welfare state – and the acceptance of inequality 
that this entails – constitute the foundation for mainstream politics in 
England today. The Labour Party, the founders of the welfare state, are 
fully signed up (post-2010) to the necessity of ‘austerity’, and arguably 
abandoned Keynes in the early-mid 1990s. Their current position seems 
to be that they would roll back the state just a little more slowly than 
the Conservative party. 40 (The recent election of ‘anti-capitalist’ party, 
Syriza, in Greece might signal a fracturing of the neo-liberal consensus, 
but it is too early to tell.) 
The Politics of Self-Harm 209
 On one level, this history of self-harm is about the organisation of 
therapeutic approaches and professional practices within health-care 
systems. In this sense, it has attempted to show how analysis of these 
areas remains critically important to understanding how and why health 
epidemics emerge. This account of the establishment and reinforce-
ment of a behavioural pattern also has more intimate consequences. 
What humans can do, how we experience our emotions and perceive 
our possibilities – these are fundamentally contextual, situated issues. 
The turn to social, relational ways of understanding mental health and 
illness dominate the possibilities for personhood in the middle third of 
the twentieth century. 
 The broad point of this book is to show how these possibilities for 
action or self-experience might come about, and (very briefly) how they 
might fall away. It is concerned chiefly to reconstruct the intellectual 
and practical environment where human self-damaging behaviours 
are chiefly interpreted as communications with a social circle, a cry for 
assistance and help, in a political climate where there exists consider-
able consensus about the weight of society’s responsibility to provide 
in a collective manner for the welfare of its citizens (the collective 
health-care and social-security arrangements referred to as the ‘post-war 
settlement’). It is because that consensus is so thoroughly overturned 
and almost discarded in the years after 1979 that this book can be seen 
as politically motivated. The collective aspect of human life is being 
forgotten in these neurological and neo-liberal reimaginings of human 
nature. 
 By using the example of self-damaging behaviour, we take an example 
that seems to have very little relation to politics (as conventionally 
conceived), and show how this scientific, clinical object is bound up and 
implicated with the much larger currents that ebb and flow in the wider 
culture. These are fuelled on a local level by seemingly mundane prac-
tical arrangements, but are no less affected and shaped by the broader 
intellectual climate. Broad administrative, therapeutic and legal struc-
tures interact with local, credible, conceptual and practical labour. This 
interaction demonstrates the crystallisation and reinforcement of partic-
ular intelligible behaviour patterns from infinite possible combinations. 
This book shows how attempted suicide as communication becomes an 
available human behaviour pattern at a certain point in history, and 
how it subsequently becomes displaced. To understand how it is that we 
act as human, self-conscious beings, we must analyse how the possibili-
ties for comprehensible actions are made. At the same time, we must 
link these possibilities to the broad political constellations from which 
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the academic humanities seem to be retreating. We must take a posi-
tion on the ascent of neo-liberalism, as its language of market-friendly 
research, financial worth and impact continues to take root in academic 
management. Politically and intellectually, it is a mistake to attempt 
to explain human complexity, human behaviour and human society 
through either simplistic market models or flattened biological or evolu-
tionary ones. This is not just because they fail to capture and explain 
human behaviour in a nuanced and credible way, but also because they 
are closed systems. They do not allow for their fundamental premises to 
be questioned or challenged . 
 Instead, we might affirm the contingency of all explanations, and 
view with scepticism all claims to unarguable truth. This does not entail 
political paralysis, but instead invites criticism of what is given or taken 
for granted in a political (or historical account). At present it is ‘given’ 
that any interference with the market creates damaging inefficiencies, 
that people cutting themselves are responding to internal feelings of 
tension, that we must ‘balance the books’ with austerity measures, that 
our brains hold the key to our selfhood. All of these assertions require 
constant engagement, criticism and debate. 
 The point about contingency and scepticism also includes this book. 
It is written after the 2008 economic crash and bailout, and during 
the election in Britain of a coalition government of Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat MPs who are ever more committed to slashing public 
budgets along with collective responsibility for social problems. In this 
particular context, it becomes clearer why the text might painstakingly 
reconstruct a time where the social setting and social interventionism 
is taken for granted. It establishes a contrast with what is considered 
so natural in the present (of 2015). Another context concerns funding. 
The PhD research which forms the basis for this book is funded – made 
possible – by the Wellcome Trust, a former pharmaceutical company, 
now a charitable foundation with huge interests in biomedicine and 
neuroscience as well as in the history of medicine (now more broadly 
conceived as ‘medical humanities’). Indeed, this book is freely acces-
sible on the Internet because of the Trust’s generous Open Access (OA) 
policy to those it funds. My engagement with politics is through the 
lens of the history of medicine and psychiatry, partially because that 
falls within the charitable remit of the Trust. This does not mean that I 
am overplaying or exaggerating the influence of connections between 
psychiatry, medicine and politics. It simply means that this book (in its 
present form) would not have been written without the Trust’s support. 
This also needs to be taken into account when weighing the book’s 
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contribution and the importance of its emphases and exclusions. I am 
no more outside my context than the psychiatrists and social workers 
I study are outside theirs. Money, funding, intellectual fashion – all the 
things that we willingly forget or skim over when writing academic 
material – they still matter. 
 Finally, it is important that reconstructing and analysing the under-
pinnings of a category based in a social setting is not the same as glori-
fying or even agreeing with high levels of social intervention. Social 
work interventionism can lead to horrifying scandals such as that in 
Cleveland in the North-East of England in the 1980s. Large numbers 
of children are removed from their families because of allegations (and 
evidence) of sexual abuse that turn out to be unfounded. 41 So this book 
is not calling for a ‘return to the social’ – even if that were possible. 
It is written instead to call for awareness of the contingency of these 
organising frameworks. Only by keeping this in our minds can we reach 
a new consensus where we can weigh our individual and collective 
responsibilities in a more equitable way. We need to see that the decline 
in credibility of the social setting, and its replacement by internal self-
regulating individuals is among the countless ways in which humans 
make and remake their worlds (including our ideas of self-damage). The 
self-evidence of these clinical, psychological and political objects makes 
them seem natural. This then serves to naturalise the context in which 
they function – market-based neo-liberalism. If we can see these objects 
as the result of human actions and human conceptual frameworks, it 
becomes possible to see that the consequences of the neo-liberal inequal-
ities that assail our society are up for ethical discussion – they are not 
simply ‘human nature’ or ‘inevitable’. They are, instead, the result of our 
actions: if we make and accept contexts where inequality is naturalised, 
then we can also put our efforts into unmaking and refusing these same 
contexts, and those inequalities . 
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